Moral philosophy

Introduction Moral philosophy used to be full of promises. In ancient times, it aimed at providing a guide to the good life that integrated moral matters with other concerns (such as our intellectual, aesthetic and prudential interests). In modern times, it set out to present a supreme principle of morality (such as Kant's categorical imperative, or the greatest-happiness principle of utilitarianism) from which a full-blown system of obligations and permissions was meant to be derived, guiding or constraining our conduct. However, if Adorno is to be believed, the promises of moral philosophy have not been fulfilled: neither the good life, nor even the moral life, is currently available. In this sense, his position can be characterized as a negative moral philosophy. What makes this position interesting is why Adorno thinks that both the good life and the moral life are blocked and what implications he draws from this in terms of criticizing the dominant strands of modern moral philosophy and suggesting how we should live our distorted and deformed lives. In this chapter we shall look at each of these aspects and ask the following questions: 1. Why can no one live the right life in our current social world? 2. Why does the task of moral philosophy today consist essentially in the critique of moral philosophy? 3. Does Adorno say anything about how we should live, or is his negative moral philosophy devoid of any practical guidance? The impossibility of right living today Adorno is not alone in thinking that something is problematic about ethical practice and theory in the modern social world. For example, contemporary Aristotelians often lament the breakdown of traditional social practices which (supposedly) underwrote the exercise of the virtues

No Easy Way Out: Adorno's Negativism and the Problem of Normativity

In this paper, I will address a question that has long overshadowed T.W. Adorno?s critical theory, namely, the question of whether or not it is possible to account for normativity within his negativistic philosophy. I believe that we can answer this question in the affirmative, but in this paper my aim will be more limited. I will clarify the problem and lay out the response strategies that are open to those hoping to defend Adorno?s theory. And I will argue that the problem cannot be dismissed as easily as is sometimes suggested, namely, by those who claim that Adorno?s theory is not normative

Was ist orthodoxe Kritische Theorie?

Lukács’ famously asked: “What is orthodox Marxism?” His answer was that a certain method was quintessential. What if we ask the orthodox question about Critical Theory? The answer in this case, I propose, is not a particular method. Moreover, what’s critical about Critical Theory is also not – contrary to prevailing opinions in the literature – a program of justification. In fact, only without such a program can Critical Theory be adequately and appropriately critical. The position I advocate returns to insights from Horkheimer’s writings of the 1930s (and Adorno’s work). Indeed, it is also orthodox in another sense: taking the conviction of a partisan interest – the interest in abolishing social injustice, misery and unfreedom – as the only general criterion for Critical Theory. Its task is to contribute to the struggle against the aforementioned negative elements through conceptual work, self-reflection, and a critical appropriation of the genuine insights of traditional theorising. I conclude by outlining briefly the implications of this position for the mode of approaching social philosophy (and specifically the idea of social pathology)

Hat hier jemand gesagt, der Kaiser sei nackt? Eine Verteidigung der Geussschen Kritik an Rawls? idealtheoretischem Ansatz [?Did Somebody Just Say the Emperor is Naked? In Defence of Geuss's Objections to Rawls's Ideal-Theoretical Approach?]

In this paper, we take up two objections Raymond Geuss levels against John Rawls? ideal theory in Philosophy and Real Politics. We show that, despite their fundamental disagreements, the two theorists share a common starting point: they both (a) reject doing political philosophy by way of applying an independently derived moral theory; and (b) grapple with the danger of unduly privileging the status quo. However, neither Rawls? characterization of politics nor his ideal theoretical approach as response to the aforementioned danger is adequate or so we argue. Moreover, contrary to received opinion, Geuss? political philosophy is the more reflective and the more philosophical of the two. In a final section, we highlight another agreement: both think that political philosophers should develop conceptual innovations as a way of clarifying and overcoming practical problems. We demonstrate that Geuss could offer a number of reasons for finding Rawls? conceptual innovations wanting

Hidden substance: mental disorder as a challenge to normatively neutral accounts of autonomy

Mental capacity and autonomy are often understood to be normatively neutral ? the only values or other norms they may presuppose are those the assessed person does or would accept. We show how mental disorder threatens normatively neutral accounts of autonomy. These accounts produce false positives, particularly in the case of disorders (such as depression, anorexia nervosa and schizophrenia) that affect evaluative abilities. Two normatively neutral strategies for handling autonomy-undermining disorder are explored and rejected: a blanket exclusion of mental disorder, and functional tests requiring consistency, expression of identity, reflective non-alienation or lack of compulsion. Finally, we suggest ways in which substantivist alternatives to neutrality can be made more promising through increased transparency, democratic contestability of conditions for capacity and autonomy, and a historically sensitive caution concerning restrictions of liberty

A whole lot of misery: Adorno's negative Aristotelianism—Replies to Allen, Celikates, and O'Connor

Can one both be an Aristotelian in ethics and a negativist, whereby the latter involves subscribing to the view that the good cannot be known in our social context but that ethical guidance is nonetheless possible in virtue of a pluralist conception of the bad (of which this context and human history provide us ample knowledge)? Moreover, is it possible to combine Aristotelianism with a thoroughly historical outlook? I have argued that such combinations are, indeed, possible, and that we can find an example of them in Adorno's work. In this paper, I reply to three critics (Allen, Celikates and O'Connor) who cast doubt on this proposal. I also reply to other concerns they raise, regarding immanent critique, negativism, the role of social theory in Adorno's work, and the danger of being co-opted. I stress the holism of Adorno's position, and, amid some more deflationary moves, insist on the distinctiveness of the Aristotelian position that results